Introduction
When we concern ourselves with the question of personal liberty and morality, it is necessary that we understand the theories made by John Mill. Mill’s central concept of liberty was as follows: The Liberty Principle where the individual’s liberty of action should be restricted if and only if his actions are detrimental to others. It establishes both a sufficient and a necessary condition for its existence, such that the individual’s liberty should be interfered with on the surface. Individual autonomy is often believed to relate to the ability to be one’s own person, to live one’s life according to reasons and motives that are accepted as one’s own and not the product of manipulative or distorting other influences, to be independent in this manner. It is a major value in the Kantian moral philosophy tradition, but it is also accorded essential significance in John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian liberalism.
On the other hand, personal liberties must also be accepted as an essential for the individuals and could not be encroached upon on the name of moral values. A person’s privacy cannot be taken away because he or she is accused of some immoral act. Both the principles must remain balanced and neutral with each other.
Personal Liberties
The individual liberty, a priceless concept which recognizes the ownership of oneself, unburdened by strings of other entities. The concept of Libertarianism comes under the purview of political philosophy, where Individual freedom is highly valued by libertarians, and they regard this as justification for robust protections for individual freedom. As a result, libertarians argue that justice imposes strict restrictions on compulsion. While people can be legally compelled to do some things (most clearly, refrain from infringing the rights of others), they cannot be compelled to serve the greater good of society or even their own personal good. As a result, libertarians support robust individual liberty and private property rights; protect civil liberties such as equal rights for gays; support drug legalization and open borders; and reject most military operations.
The classical liberal tradition, as exemplified by John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, and Immanuel Kant, is strongly connected to (and at times virtually indistinguishable with) libertarian thought. It affirms a clear distinction between the public and private spheres of life; insists on the status of individuals as morally free and equal, which it interprets as implying a strong requirement of individual sovereignty; and believes that respect for this status necessitates treating people as right-holders, including holders of property rights.
In On Liberty Mill says that the virtue of growing uniqueness and fostering talents is one of many reasons to support freedom (Mill believes there are many):
“Individuality is the same thing with development, and…it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings…what more can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this?”[1]
This is more than just a political theory: it is a substantial, perfectionist, moral theory about the good. According to this viewpoint, the appropriate thing to do is to encourage progress or perfection, but only a government that ensures wide liberty for all citizens can do this.[2] This moral ideal of human perfection and development dominated liberal thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: not only Mill, but T.H. Green, L.T. Hobhouse, Bernard Bosanquet, John Dewey, and even Rawls all endorsed variants of this perfectionist ethic and the claim that it provides a foundation for endorsing a regime of liberal rights.[3] And it is central to the advocates of liberal autonomy described above, as well as ‘liberal virtue’ theorists like William Galston.[4] The prevailing liberal ethic of the last century was undoubtedly that the good life is inevitably one that is freely chosen in which a person develops his particular talents as part of a plan of life.
Moralism
Moral contractualism, which may be split into “Kantian” and “Hobbesian” variants, is the major challenge to Millian perfectionism’s standing as the uniquely liberal ethic. Kantian contractualism holds that “society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good…”.[5] Respect for the personhood of others, according to this viewpoint, requires us to avoid from imposing our idea of the good life on others. Only principles that can be justified to everyone respect each individual’s personhood. As a result, modern liberal thought[6] has tended to convert the social contract from an explanation of the state to an overarching justification of morality, or at the very least a social morality. The concept that appropriately idealized persons are driven not by the pursuit of gain, but by a commitment or desire to publicly explain the claims they make on others, is central to such “Kantian contractualism”.[7] A moral code that may be agreed upon by such persons is therefore a publically justified morality.
In contrast, Hobbesian contractualism assumes simply that individuals are self-interested and rightly perceives that a framework of rules that shape social life and distribute the rewards of social cooperation enhances each person’s capacity to successfully pursue her interests.[8] To summarise: morality can be defined as a framework that promotes the self-interest of all parties. As a result of the importance of individual freedom and property in such a common framework, Hobbesian contractualism is considered a distinctly liberal conception of morality.[9] The apparent rationality of free-riding is a continuous dilemma for Hobbesian contractualism: if everyone (or enough) complies with the conditions of the contract, and thus social order is attained, it would appear logical to defect, and act immorally, when one may earn by doing so.
Mill, as we’ve seen, appears to be adamantly opposed to legal moralism. Other Millian liberals, such as Feinberg, regard opposition to legal moralism as a fundamental commitment to liberalism. Of course, much of morality is focused with harm prevention, and major sections of criminal law outlawing murder, rape, assault, and theft are plainly concerned with preventing particularly egregious moral wrongs that hurt others. As a result, much of the criminal law serves to both avoid injury and enforce morality. These are not only fortuitous results, given that the immorality of much illegal behaviour is based on its harmfulness.
Even though there is some overlap between harmful behaviour and wrongdoing, the two are different. The conventional legal moralism dispute between Devlin[10] and Hart[11] focused on the legislative enforcement of sexual morality, including the regulation of homosexuality and prostitution. Both sides agreed that these acts were immoral but harmless, and they discussed whether it was legitimate to control them in order to enforce sexual morality. However, we may reject Devlin’s moralistic ideas not because we oppose legal moralism in general, but because we do not consider homosexuality or prostitution to be immoral in and of themselves. If they were the only candidates for innocuous conduct, we may wonder if such a thing existed. As a result, we might consider a less contentious scenario of harmless immorality, such as promise-breaking or lying that does not result in harm.
Assume Junior borrows his parents’ automobile without their permission and nothing bad happens. Here’s an example of innocuous misconduct. Consider the following case for moral legislation: (i) Society has a purpose to prohibit immoral activity, whether or not it causes harm. (ii) Junior’s use of the car without parental consent is an example of inconsequential misconduct. (iii) As a result, society has the right to restrict Junior’s actions.
While the following argument would be rejected because we cannot appeal to the false illiberal conclusions to reject moralistic premises. If we consider the personal rights of a person from the lens of morality it becomes clear that rights are an essential of a utilitarian and liberalist society. There is a connection between right and morality and according to Mill, rights must work as secondary principles to protect the interests and liberties of the people. They are in a sense the embodiment of the moralistic views which we seek to enforce.
Conclusion
The personal liberties of an individual are connected with moralistic principles. A moral principle however must not encroach over the rights of a person and rather must work as an instrument of validation for the rights, supporting and protecting it. The principles discussed above provides for a liberalistic view of liberties and moral applications and therefore both personal liberty and morality must affirm each other.
References:
[1] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Cambridge University Press 2011).
[2] Steven Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint (Cambridge University Press 1998).
[3] Gerald F. Gaus, The Modern Liberal Theory of Man (St. Martin’s Press 1983).
[4] William Galston, Justice and the Human Good (University of Chicago Press 1980).
[5] Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge University Press 1982).
[6] Jeffrey Reiman, Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy (Yale University Press 1990).
[7] Id.
[8] Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton University Press 1986).
[9] Gerald F. Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project (Sage Pub. 2003).
[10] P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford University Press 1965).
[11] H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (Stanford University Press 1963).
0 Comments