A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur [(2015) 2 SCC 22]

Facts of the Case:

In the present case, the appellant-husband and respondent-wife both were doctors by profession. Husband filed a divorce petition against his wife on the grounds of cruelty under section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The trial court found that the allegations made by the wife on his husband amount to mental agony and cruelty. However, it passed the decree of judicial separation instead of a decree of divorce by keeping in mind the welfare of children. But the HC set aside the decree passed by the trial court on the ground that the material on records was not sufficient to prove mental cruelty. Hence, the appellant-husband preferred this appeal.

Issues Raised

In this matter following are the issues raised –

• What constitutes cruelty under section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
• Whether the order passed by High Court is justified?

Rule of Law

In this matter, relevant sections are as follows:

• Section 10 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: This section of the act[1] talks about judicial separation according to which a suit for the decree of judicial separation can be filed by either party of the marriage on the grounds given under section 13(1) or by wife on the grounds given under section 13(2) of the act.[2] Moreover, this decree is also an alternative relief given by courts in divorce proceedings depending upon the facts and circumstances of the cases.
• Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:  This section of the act deals with Divorce which can be filed on the grounds mentioned hereinafter –
  • Fault grounds mentioned under section 13(1)
  • Breakdown grounds mentioned under section 13(1A)(i)
  • Divorce by mutual consent as provided under section 13-B

In the case of A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur,[3] the husband filed the divorce case based on mental cruelty by the wife given under section 13(1)(ii) of the act.[4]

Judgment Analysis

The appellant-husband submitted that the decision taken by the High Court was not accurate, because the evidence on the records had not been analyzed in depth. He argued that mental cruelty was evidently established and that the marriage had irretrievably broken down in any case and the divorce decree should have been passed solely based on that. Contrarily, the respondent-wife contended the evidence was insufficient and does not establish mental cruelty. In S. Hanumantha Rao v. S. Ramani,[5] the court dealt with what constitutes cruelty and held that normal wear and tear in a relationship cannot be a ground for seeking divorce.[6]

So, to analyze whether the approach taken by High Court is right or not, we should first look into the requisite ingredients for constituting cruelty.

In the act, the word “cruelty” is not defined, it can be either mental or physical. Cruelty, i.e., is the basis for the termination of marriage, can be described as willful and unjustifiable behavior of a nature such as to trigger, or to give birth to a fair apprehension of, a danger to life, bodily or mental. In view of the norms of marital relations of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social values, their status, and the atmosphere in which they reside, the issue of mental cruelty must be considered. If the same is proved from the actions of his spouse or a deduction can be reasonably made that the care of the partner is such that it induces an anxiety regarding her/his mental well-being in the brain of the other partner, then this would amount to cruelty.[7]

There may be material and concrete evidence of physical cruelty, but when it comes to mental cruelty, there might not be material or direct evidence. In cases in which there is a lack of concrete and direct evidence, the courts are expected to test the mental process and effects of evidence-based events. It is in this view that the facts in marital disputes need to be weighed.

In Sobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi,[8] the court stated that when there is mental cruelty, First, the inquiry should start with respect to the essence of cruel treatment, secondly, such treatment’s effect on the spouse’s mind, whether it induced a reasonable fear that living with the other spouse would be injurious to life or health. Ultimately, by considering the quintessence of the actions and effects on other partners and an inference should be deduced. There can be a scenario, however, where the activity claimed by itself is wrong enough and illegal per se. Then in such a situation, it is not appropriate to enquire about or take into account the harmful impact on the other partner. In such matters, whether the conduct itself is proven, the cruelty would be established.[9]

In Baker v. Baker,[10] the court stated that for constituting cruelty, the complained behavior must be “grave and weighty” so that court can conclude that the complaining partner cannot reasonably live with the other partner. The conduct should be much more than the usual wear and tear of marriage. For constituting cruelty, physical abuse is not necessary and a clear course of action that inflicts uncountable mental agony can very well amount to cruelty within the ambit of Section 10 of the Act. Mental Cruelty may also involve verbal insults and abuses via disgusting and offensive language which destroys the mental peace of other partners.

However, Any marital actions that can cause the other’s irritation may not constitute cruelty. Even, mere trivial issues between partners, arising in everyday married life, do not constitute cruelty. In marital life, cruelty may be of an unfounded type and maybe words, actions, or mere silence.

In Dastane v. Dastane,[11] the court was of the opinion that the basis of a good marriage is tolerating and respecting each other. Tolerance must be intrinsic in any marriage to a particular bearable degree to the mistakes of one another. In deciding what amounts to cruelty in every case, while weighing the case, one must always keep in mind the social status and character of the spouses and the physical and mental situations of the partners. The court does not deal with ideal spouses. Rather, it must deal with real men and women. There would certainly be no reason for the perfect or ideal partners to the Family Court.[12]

There is one thing that is obvious when reading the judgments of the lower court and the High Court. Although the trial court evaluated the evidence on records in detail and found out that the wife’s stance about her actions and behavior induced mental agony which constitutes mental cruelty, the evidence was not addressed at all by the Court of Appeal. On the specious ground that hospital witnesses were not examined and adverse inferences were therefore to be made. There was not even debate as to how the evidence provided was inadequate to determine mental cruelty. The view of the Appellate Court that the respondent was using offensive language and making charges of adultery with nursing workers, it was important to examine some witnesses from the hospital is indefensible. The determinative factor for discarding evidence on record should not be produced alone. On that ground alone, the High Court’s decision is vulnerable.[13]

The evidence, as led and unchallenged, is that the respondent-wife asked the appellant-husband to do certain things that cannot be defined as mere advice on proper conduct. In her testimony, for instance, the respondent agreed that she had said five things that he would follow. Surprisingly, most of them were linked to women in the hospital working there. Although the respondent tried to show that they were plain and harmless advice, it is evident that these were clear indications of her suspecting the loyalty, character, and integrity of the appellant-husband on a mere reading of it.

It can be seen, by way of example, that the first so-called suggestion was not to ask those female workers to come and work on off-duty hours because no one else was available at the hospital. The second was not to work with those team members behind closed doors. The so-called advice was nothing but putting doubt on her husband’s integrity, character, and loyalty, contrary to what she had mentioned about having full faith in her husband. Nagging on these aspects undoubtedly amounted to the induction of a lot of mental agony amounting to cruelty.

Respondent was a doctor, not an ordinary woman.  She understood the significance of the kind of duty and the need for staff members to work even during off-hours and working conditions. There was another instance that the lower court explicitly dealt with. The same was true of the appellant’s supposed extra-marital relationship with some other married lady who was his friend’s wife. Although the respondent sought to clarify that she is not responsible for making any such aspersions, the conclusion inferred is the opposite. When the respondent gives precedence over the freedom of her spouse to her occupation, it wrongly points to disharmony, diffusion, and disintegration of marital unity, from which the apex court can deduce the irretrievable breakdown of marriage.[14]

Conclusion

The apex court in this matter held that the decision of the high court is not justified on the ground that it did not discuss the evidence on records on the specious ground that witnesses from the hospital not examined and hence, adverse inference was to be drawn. It also did not discuss that how the evidence on records was insufficient in establishing mental cruelty. Further, it held that the appellant-husband is entitled to a decree of divorce.

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References:

[1] Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, No. 25, Act of Parliament, § 10 (1955).

[2] Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, No. 25, Act of Parliament, § 13 (1955).

[3] (2015) 2 SCC 22.

[4] Ibid.

[5] (1999) 2 SCR 296.

[6] S. Hanumantha Rao v. S. Ramani, (1999) 2 SCR 296.

[7] Harinder Boparai, The Expansion of Matrimonial Cruelty, Journal of Indian Law Institute, 23 JILI (1981) 34.

[8] (1988) 1 SCR 1010.

[9] Sobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCR 1010.

[10] Baker v. Baker, The Times, 11 December, 1919.

[11] (1975) 3 SCR 967.

[12] Dastane v. Dastane, (1975) 3 SCR 967.

[13] A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, (2015) 2 SCC 22.

[14] Ibid.