Article 14: Armor Against Breach of Arbitrariness

Introduction

The Indian Constitution is an ever evolving and living piece of authority. While the constitutional makers and envisaged a perfectly created text, it would be foolish to presume that even the Constitution does not contain a few oversights. Thus, it is significant that the courts apply judicial mind and long-established doctrines to correct any obscure errors form the Constitutional framework. One of the notoriously debated element of oversight in the Indian Constitution manifest itself in Article 14[1] of the fundamental rights, this element is that of arbitrariness. The Article itself seeks to protect the citizen of India from discrimination, deeming all of them equal before law and worthy of equal protection before law.

Concept of Arbitrariness

The Doctrine of arbitrariness first emerged in the purview of Indian Constitution in the case of E.P Royappa[2], where the Supreme Court paved way for a wider scope of Article 14, interpreting it beyond its wordings. It was observed that if the Article 14 guarantees a protection against arbitrariness. The Doctrine itself promotes the use of reasonable classification in spite of Article 14, thus proving an asset to classify those who are unequal and providing legislature a way to distinguish and create much-needed policies for the disadvantaged. Bhagwati J., while speaking on the three facets of Article 14 i.e., unjustness, unfairness and arbitrariness, noted that equality is antithetic to arbitrariness and both are stark opposite of each other.

Arbitrariness is in violation of the principles of Rule of Law, which is to say that for Rule of Law to remain stable, the absence of arbitrary power is essential.[3] Article 14 is a guardian against arbitrariness and ensures fairness and equality in the treatment of those who had pledged to India i.e., its citizens. Therefore, Article 14 must function in such a way that not only it is right, just and fair, but also not arbitrary, fanciful and oppressive.[4]

The Article 14’s Doctrine of Arbitration prohibits class legislation but allows the application of reasonable classification of persons or things. According to the court in Anwar Ali Sarkar case[5] the test of classification is as follows:

• Ineligible Differentia: In this test classification is made in the grouped form where like should be treated alike and unlike should not be treated like.
• Rational Relation: In this test, the differential should have a rational relation with the object of the Act.

Evolution of Article 14

The Article 14’s doctrine of arbitrariness had long faced criticism from legal jurists and is believed to be a simple reassertion of the reasonable classification test. Supreme Court decisions attempted to give the doctrine some substance by equating it with the concept of “unreasonableness,” but it was unclear whether this unreasonableness related to the “distributive aspect” of article 14 or could be used to justify constitutional scrutiny even in the absence of comparative unreasonableness.

In the case of Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi[6], the court determined that wherever there is arbitrariness in state activity, whether it be by the legislature, the executive, or any other “authority” as defined by Article 12, Article 14 must instantly spring into action to overturn it. Article 14 is intended to counter arbitrariness by implying that any conduct that is arbitrary is a denial of equality. In truth, the classification doctrine is not the end of Article 14’s goal. Its sole purpose is to evaluate if the legislative or executive action in question is capricious, and hence it is a judicial method in determining whether or not there has been a denial of equality. The concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness, in fact, is the essence of our constitution and is the golden thread which runs through its fabric.

Further, in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, the court observed that reasonableness is an essential element of equality and non-arbitrariness in both legal and philosophical sphere. Therefore, the principle of reasonableness is seen as an omnipresent element in Article 14.

The true meaning and scope of Article 14 was laid down in the following points[7]:

1. A legislation may be valid even if it applies to a single individual if, due to specific circumstances or reasons applicable to him but not to others, that single individual is treated as a class unto himself.
2. There has to be a presumption in favor of a statute’s constitutionality, and the burden is on those who challenge it to demonstrate a clear violation of constitutional principles.
3. In certain situations, the assumption may be rebutted by demonstrating that, on the facts of the legislation, there is no categorization and no distinction specific to any individual or class and not applicable to any other individual or class, and yet the law affects only one individual or class.
4. It must be presumed that the legislature accurately recognizes the necessity of its own people for its laws to be oriented to problems revealed by experience and for its discrimination to be founded on adequate grounds.
5. To preserve the presumption of constitutionality, the judiciary may consider factors of common knowledge, matters of report, the history of the times, and may assume any set of facts that may be envisaged as existing at the time of the enactment.
6. As a corollary, the legislation is free to recognize varying degrees of harm and may limit its application to circumstances where the need is regarded to be the most pressing.
7. While a legislature’s good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions are to be presumed, if nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances is brought to the court’s attention on which the categorization may fairly be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent that there must be some undisclosed and unknown factor.
8. The classification can be created on a variety of criteria, such as geographical or based on an object, employment, or the like.
9. The legislature’s classification need not become scientifically or logically faultless. Perfect equality and mathematical accuracy are not required.
10. Equality before the law does not necessitate mathematical equality of all people in all situations. The term “equal treatment” does not entail “same treatment.” Similarly, the identity of the treatment is insufficient.
11. Discrimination is possible in both substantive and procedural law. Article 14 is applicable to both.

If the classification meets the criteria outlined in the preceding propositions, the law will be considered constitutional. The question of whether a classification is fair and proper or not must, however, be decided on the basis of common sense rather than legal rules. Therefore, application and interpretation of the situation by the courts is also required in addition of the tests.

In the Triple Talaq[8] too, the Supreme Court talked about the importance of protecting article 14 and other constitutional rights from arbitration. The court tried the §2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 and held that the concept of Triple Talaq was “manifestly arbitrary” in the sense that the marital ties can be quickly broken by Muslim man in a “capricious and whimsical” manner, without any scope of reconciliation. This judgment paved way to the evolution of doctrine of “manifest arbitrariness”; Nairman, J., analysed the concept of arbitrariness in context of Indian Jurisprudence and observed that: “Arbitrariness in legislation is very much a facet of unreasonableness in Articles 19(2)-(6), as has been laid down in several judgements of this Court, therefore, there is no reason why arbitrariness cannot be used in aforesaid sense to strike down legislation under Article 14 as well”[9]

Before proceeding further, we will examine the ratio in Rajbala v. State of Haryana[10], where Te facts of the issue were that females and people from less affluent backgrounds in Haryana were not allowed to vote or run-in elections. This was just a breach of their fundamental right, and it was arbitrary because there was no rational reason to exclude them from voting or contesting elections. In order to protect Article 14, the Court ruled that females should be granted the right to vote and run for office. Gender discrimination should not be tolerated.

In the case of K.S Puttaswamy[11], Chandrachud, J., observed that

“The pursuit of a legitimate State aim ensures that the law does not suffer from manifest arbitrariness. Legitimacy, as a postulate, involves a value judgment. Judicial review does not reappreciate or second guess the value judgment of the legislature but is for deciding whether the aim which is sought to be pursued suffers from palpable or manifest arbitrariness. The third requirement ensures that the means which are adopted by the legislature are proportional to the object and needs sought to be fulfilled by the law. Proportionality is an essential facet of the guarantee against arbitrary State action because it ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is not disproportionate to the purpose of the law.”[12]

Conclusion

The Article 14 is the guardian against the concept of arbitrariness. It also shines light over the vague dark which the various statutes uses to hide the arbitrary provisions. We have analysed the concept of arbitrariness and “manifest arbitrariness”. Given the legal judgments made by the Supreme Court’s constitution benches, it is quite evident that such an exercise is constitutionally acceptable. The logic works as follows: All arbitrary state activities (legislative and executive) are diametrically opposed to the ideal of equality. As a result, any arbitrary state actions will be in violation of article 14.

However, the Constitution is a text that serves as a check on all three branches of government, including the judiciary. If the court has given itself the authority to impose extra-constitutional principles in order to improve the delivery of justice, this authority must be subjected to even more scrutiny and limitation. When it comes to the credibility of institutions in a democracy and the certainty of law, bringing unclear theories that serve no broader purpose would diminish the judiciary’s legitimacy.

---

References:

[1] India Const. art. 14.

[2] E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3.

[3] S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427.

[4] E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3.

[5] State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75.

[6] (1981) 1 SCC 722.

[7] Ramkrishna Dalmia v Justice Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538.

[8] ShayaraBano v. Union Of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.

[9] ShayaraBano v. Union Of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.

[10] Rajbala v. State of Haryana, (2016) 2 SCC 445.

[11] (2017) 10 SCC 1.

[12] Id at 310.