Analysis of K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra

INTRODUCTION

The present discussion on the case ‘K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra’[1]  is one of the most famous cases in the judicial history of India. In this case the Navy commander, K.M. Nanavati was convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of his wife’s paramour, Prem Ahuja. This case of 1961 is one of the most highlighted cases of the Supreme Court, which is even studied today. Let us discuss the different aspects of this case.

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. The accused Nanavati was a naval commander, when this murder was committed. He married Sylvia in 1949 in England and had three children from this wedlock.
2. Since the time of marriage, the couple had to live at different places because of the nature of the job of Nanavati.
3. In the same city the deceased Ahuja was a businessman and was residing, along with his sister, in a building called “Jivan Jyot” in Setalvad Road. In the year 1956, Agniks, who were mutual friends of Nanavati’s and Ahujas, introduced Ahujas to Nanavati’s.
4. Nanavati, as a Naval Officer, was frequently going away from Bombay, leaving his wife and children in Bombay alone.
5. Gradually, a friendship developed between Ahuja and Sylvia, which as a fact resulted in illicit intimacy between them.
6. On April 27, 1959, Sylvia confessed to Nanavati of her illicit intimacy with Ahuja.
7. Thereafter, he drove his wife, two of his children at the cinema and dropped them there and told to pick them up at 6 P.M. when the show ended.
8. He then drove to his ship and represented as he wanted medicine for his dog and that he wanted to draw a revolver and six rounds from the stores of the ship as he was going to drive alone to Ahmednagar by night, though the real purpose was to shoot himself.
9. On receiving the revolver and six cartridges, and put it inside a brown envelope. Then he drove his car to Ahuja’s office, but he did not find him there, he drove to Ahuja’s flat, and, a servant opened the door, he walked to Ahuja’s bed-room, went into the bedroom and shut the door behind him. He was also carrying the brown envelope containing the revolver, along with him.
10. The accused saw the deceased inside the bed-room, and after an abusive exchange between them, he asked him whether he would marry Sylvia and look after the children.
11. The deceased retorted, “Am I to marry every woman I sleep with?” The accused became enraged, put the envelope containing the revolver nearby, and threatened to thrash the deceased.
12. He then loaded the same and shot him dead.
13. Thereafter, the accused surrendered himself to the police. He was put under arrest and in due course he was committed to the Sessions for facing a charge under s. 302[2] of the Indian Penal Code.

HIERARCHY OF THE CASE

• The appellant was charged under s. 302 as well as under s. 304, Part I, of the Indian Penal Code and was tried by the Sessions Judge, Bombay, with the help of a special jury[3].
• The jury brought in a verdict of “not guilty” under both the sections.
• But the Sessions Judge did not agree with the verdict of the jury, as in his view no reasonable men would come to such decision after having regard to the evidence.
• The learned Sessions Judge after being dissatisfied submitted the case under s. 307(explained later in the discussion) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Bombay High Court after recording the grounds for his opinion.
• In Bombay High Court, the division bench consisting of Shelat and Naik, JJ. Conducted this reference.
• Both the learned Judges agreed with Sessions judge and said that no jury can with regard to evidence made out to reduce the offense from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
• High court found Nanavati guilty of the murder of Ahuja, which was challenged further by filing a petition in the Supreme Court. The present petition we are discussing was the one which was proceeded to the Supreme Court.
• On the date of conviction by High Court (hereinafter HC), Governor of Bombay by using his power under Article 161[4] of the Indian Constitution ordered the suspension of Nanavati.
• The question was whether the Governor had the power to suspend the sentence when the matter was subjudice in the Supreme Court.
• On the principle of harmonious construction and to avoid a conflict between the executive and judicial powers, it was held that Article 161 does not deal with the suspension of sentence during the time the matter was pending in SC.

CASE ANALYSIS

There are mainly four aspects that have been discussed in this judgment at length which led to the decision of the case and that are as follows (1) Limitations and powers of the High Court (2) Misdirections of the Sessions Judge (3) Evidence (4) Legal issue.

I. LIMITATIONS AND POWERS OF THE HIGH COURT:

1. Limitations:
   • G.S. Pathak, learned counsel of the prosecutor (Nanavati) in the present petition, found the verdict of acquittal by the jury right and in the process of defending his client, he contends that HC’s power is limited in regard with judging the decision of the jury and thus presents before the present court his contentions for proving his point.
   • Power under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for the purpose of discussing the limitation on HC, is divided into two parts or situations. In situation one, if HC finds the verdict of the jury reasonable, whether it is for the acquittal or conviction of the accused, HC will give a decision according to the jury’s decision, without moving further from this stage. Also in situation two, if HC finds the decision of the jury as unreasonable, it must refer back the case to the Sessions judge who will convict or acquit the accused as the case maybe and then after the decision of the Sessions judge, parties may appeal in the HC that the conviction or acquittal is wrong.
   • In order to support this above mentioned confined powers of the HC, the learned counsel mentioned other sections of the code. He contends that Section 307 is constructed on two situations discussed in the sections mentioned hereunder.
   • Under sec. 268. Of CrPc, “All the trials before a court of session shall be either by jury or by the judge himself.” This section clearly reads out that all trials shall take place under these either situations only i.e. first by the jury and second by the judge.
   • In the first situation i.e. trial by the jury has been described in sec.297 which reads as:  “In cases tried by jury, when the case for the defence and the prosecutor’s reply, if any, are concluded, the Court shall proceed to charge the jury, summing up the evidence for the prosecution and defence, and laying down the law by which the jury are to be guide…..”. It means that the jury is to be guided by the court for the matters of the law. And after the decision is taken by the jury, they sum up their case to the judge, informing the judge of their verdict.
   • If the judge finds the verdict of the jurors reasonable, he gives judgment accordingly, of acquittal or conviction, as the case may be. In case of conviction, one can appeal to the HC under s. 417 of the Code. But S. 418 of the Code provides that in the trials taken up by the jury, the appeal shall lie only on the matter of law, because of the basic presumption that jurors are not law practitioners, and thus if they are mistaken in giving the verdict, it must presumptuously on the matter of law and not matter of fact.
   • Section 423 of the Code, confers powers on the appellate Court in the matter of disposal of the appeal, such as a hearing of the pleaders, calling for the records, and passing appropriate orders therein. This section specifies the functions of the appellate court whereas the previously mentioned section i.e. 418 specifies the nature of the trial and then puts limitations. But there is another limitation on the power of the appellate court which is contained in Sub Sec. (2) of s. 423 which takes away all the powers of the appellate court in one go, to alter or reverse the verdict of the jury, unless the appellate court opines that such verdict is erroneous owing to (1) Misdirection by the Sessions Judge in charging the jury (2) Misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by the judge.
   • And the second situation i.e. trial by the judge is described in sec. 298 which imposes a duty on a judge to decide all questions of law arising in the course of the trial, and especially all questions as to the relevancy of facts which it is proposed to be proved, and the admissibility of evidence or the propriety of questions asked by or on behalf of the parties, and to decide upon all matters of fact which it is necessary to prove to enable evidence of particular matter to be given. Thus, this section clearly lays down that all the responsibilities fall on the Judge than on the jurors.
2. Powers:
   • From the above discussion it seems the learned counsel of the prosecutor, wanted to demarcate the powers of the HC, but the powers of the HC in the present case have been said of having the wider scope and above these limitations.
   • The reference made by the Sessions Judge to the HC is competent only if it fulfills these conditions, namely, (i) that he disagrees with the verdict of the jurors, and (ii) that he is clearly of the opinion that the verdict is one which no reasonable body of men could have reached on the evidence, after reaching that opinion, in the case submitted by him he shall record the grounds of his opinion.
   •  The High Court can reject the appeal of Sessions Judge if these abovementioned conditions are not fulfilled. HC can also reject it if the Sessions Judge has contravened sub-s. (2) Of s. 307 which expresses that in the situation where Sessions Judge does not find a verdict of the jury reasonable, in that case, he shall not record the judgment of acquittal or conviction on any of the charges on which the accused has been tried, but he may either remand such accused to custody or admit him to bail.
   • If the submitted case clearly proves the opinion of the Sessions Judge of jurors being unreasonable while taking the decision, then the HC under sub s. (3) of s. 307 of the Code, has to dispose of its implied duty i.e. considering the evidence, giving due weightage to the opinion of the Sessions Judge, and then giving the decision of either acquittal or conviction of the accused.
   • The High Court may deal with the reference in two ways, namely, (i) if there are misdirections vitiating the verdict of the jurors, he may set aside the verdict of the jury and gives his new decision  (ii) even if there are no misdirections, the HC can interfere with the verdict of the jury if it finds the verdict” perverse in the sense of being unreasonable”, “manifestly wrong”, or “against the weight of evidence”, or, in other words, if the verdict is such that no reasonable body of men could have reached on the evidence.
   • In the disposal of the said reference, the High Court can exercise any of the procedural powers appropriate to the occasion, such as, issuing of notice, calling for records, remanding the case, ordering a retrial, etc.
   • Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel, G.S. Pathak was rejected by the present court, as according to this court, the powers of HC are far wider than its limitations mentioned by the learned counsel in his contentions, while defending the prosecutor.

II. MISDIRECTIONS BY THE SESSIONS JUDGE:

 Another issue arising in the present case was that according to the HC, there were six misdirections in the charge of Jury by the Sessions Judge. Before discussing these misdirections, let us get to know that what actually misdirections are? Misdirections are something which a judge while charging the jury, tells or imparts to the jury which is wrong or conveyed in a wrong manner which tends to mislead them. Even an omission to mention certain matters which are essential to the prosecution or the defense case in order to help the jury to come to a correct verdict may also in certain circumstances amount to a misdirection.  Now let us discuss these six misdirections as according to HC committed by Sessions Judge while in the charge of the Jury:

1. The first misdirection on the part of the Sessions Judge is that he made no reference to section 105 of Evidence Act in the entire charge which reads as follows: Section 105 “When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860) or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.” This means that the accused when brings the case under General Exceptions of IPC, like in present case, the accused made reference to the General Exception of Accident, that his murder was an accident, the burden of proving falls upon him under section 105 of Evidence Act, which generally is on the person bringing the case, like in present case Prem Ahuja was the one who brought the case in Sessions Court and has to prove Nanavati guilty but under section 105 of Evidence Act, it befalls on Nanavati as he used General Exception of sec. 80 under IPC. But there was no reference of sec. 105 made by the Sessions Judge to jurors in the entire charge.
2. The second omission is that the Sessions Judge failed to explain to the jury the legal ingredients of s. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, reads as: “Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution” and also failed to direct them that in law the said section was not applicable to the facts of the case. If we take the present case as the illustration of this section, we will presume that the accused brings his offense of murder with which he is charged by the accused, under section 80 of IPC, and with the virtue of the section calls it a mere accident. The prosecution may rebut that, and then he brings to the court his evidences. But because of the mixing up of the ingredients of the offence with that of the exception, Sessions Judge omits to tell the jury that the accused relied on sec. 80 and there was a statutory presumption against him which he has to prove wrong by rebutting. But G.S. Pathak disagrees with the HC and contends that the accused had not relied upon the exception under s. 80, IPC and argues that whole evidence has been adduced by both parties, so the jury was absolutely right while giving the verdict. But even after his contention, HC considers this omission of Sessions Judge as a grave misdirection which certainly vitiated the verdict of the jurors.
3. The next misdirection relates to the question of grave and sudden provocation. The Sessions Judge failed to tell the jury that the confession of the wife did not amount to grave and sudden provocation. Sessions judge relied upon certain English Law textbooks which relates this question to a question of law and must be decided by the Judge. Mr. Pathak contends that Sessions Judge was absolutely right in considering the question of sudden and grave provocation as a matter of law, which must be decided by learned judge only, having complete knowledge of law. The contention of Mr. Pathak was strong which is why Attorney General concluded this omission not in the category of misdirections.
4. The fourth misdirection found by the High Court is that the learned Sessions Judge told the jury to rely on the rule of circumstantial evidences and also to apply the stringent rule of burden of proof which is generally applied in such cases. Sessions Judge failed to make a mention to the extrajudicial evidence which was clearly present in the case, in the form of the extra-judicial confession given by Puransingh.  Mr. Pathak contends that the Sessions Judge dealt with the value of both circumstantial evidence as well as extra-judicial evidence, in two different parts. But many times Sessions Judge laid more importance on circumstantial evidences and said that jury should decide with the assistance of circumstantial evidence only. Though at one place he emphasized upon the evidentiary value of a confession he later on included that confession also as one of the circumstances and again directed the jury to apply the rule of circumstantial evidence. Thus we can say that this was grave misdirection on the part of Sessions Judge.
5. The next misdirection by HC, imposed on the Sessions Judge was his omission of not referring three letters written by Sylvia, to the jurors in his charge. He omitted to mention the effect of letters on the evidences of Sylvia and Nanavati. Mr. Pathak contends that these letters were read by both the parties and a reference was also made to them in the evidence of Sylvia and, therefore according to Mr. Pathak jury clearly knew the contents of the letters, and even if they were not mentioned by the Sessions Judge, it was not a misdirection and even if it was it did not affect the verdict of the jury. The fact that letters were read to jurors by both parties, in itself cannot absolve the Judge from his clear duty to put the contents of the letters before the jury. Thus it was a clear misdirection on the part of Sessions Judge.
6. The next defect pointed out by the High Court is that the Sessions Judge allowed the counsel for the accused to elicit from the police officer, Phansalkar, what Puransingh is alleged to have stated to him orally, in order to contradict the evidence of Puransingh in the court, and the Judge also dealt with the evidence so elicited in paragraph 18 of his charge to the jury. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that not only the learned Sessions Judge acted illegally in admitting the alleged omission in evidence to contradict the evidence of Puransingh, but also clearly misdirected himself in placing the said evidence before the jury for their consideration.

III. EVIDENCES:

The other most discussed aspect of the case is Evidences. Evidences have been discussed in three parts (i) evidence relating to the conduct of the accused before the shooting incident, (ii) evidence in regard to the conduct of the accused after the incident, and (iii) evidence in regard to the actual shooting in the bed-room of Ahuja. From the consideration of the entire evidence the following facts emerge: Prem Ahuja seduced Sylvia, wife of the accused and after the establishment of a relationship between Sylvia and the deceased, she confessed of her illicit intimacy with the deceased to her husband, Nanavati.

The accused had sufficient for getting enraged after the confession of his wife and to do away with the deceased. It has been observed that the act of securing the revolver from the ship, enveloping it, going to Ahuja’s flat unceremoniously, with a loaded revolver and coming out with the revolver in his hand after few seconds was the clear evidence of his deliberate motive. The deceased was found dead in his bathroom with bullet injuries on his body. Whether the revolver in the hand of the accused caused injuries to Ahuja or not, was not disputed.

Nanavati did not tell anybody till his trial in the Sessions Court that he shot the deceased by accident. But indeed he confessed and practically admitted his guilt to chowkidar Puran Singh and his colleague Samuel. The description of his struggle in the bathroom was totally devoid of all necessary particulars and seemed artificial. The injuries on the body of the deceased were clear evidences of intentional shooting, being wholly inconsistent with the accidental shooting. Therefore the Supreme Court in the present appeal completely agreed with the HC, that the accused has intentionally shot the deceased and killed him.

 IV. LEGAL ISSUE OF THE CASE:

• As it was contended by Mr. Pathak that the accused shot the deceased while deprived of the power of self-control by sudden and grave provocation. Thus the question arises that whether the offence would fall under Exception 1 to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code which reads as: “Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident”. Under this exception, culpable homicide is not murder if the following conditions are complied with: (1) There must have been a provocation by the deceased (2) The provocation must be grave. (3) The provocation must be sudden. (4) The offender shall have been deprived of the power of self-control by such provocation (5) During the continuance of the deprivation of the self-control, he should have killed the deceased(6) The offender must have caused the death of the person who was behind such provocation or by any other person by mistake or accident. The question that the Court has to consider is whether a reasonable person placed in the same position as the accused was, would have reacted to the confession of adultery by his wife in the manner in which the accused did.
• After referring to the cases of re Murugian, re C. Narayan, Jan Muhammad v. Emperor, Emperor v. Balku and Babu Lal v. State; all dealing with a husband killing his wife when his mind was enraged already by the confession of his wife about her infidelity and he killed the deceased inflow of that sudden and grave provocation.
• The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus: (1) The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first Exception to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.
• The court concluded that neither it is possible nor desirable by the court to come to the conclusion by setting certain standards because every case has to be and must be decided by considering every evidence precisely based on different circumstances. In this case it is not necessary to examine the question that whether the reasonable man in the same situation would be provoked gravely and suddenly by the confession of his wife about her illicit intimacy with another man, such that he killed the paramour of his wife. It is not necessary because the evidences of this case are sufficient to prove that the accused had sufficient time between provocation and the offence committed to regain his self control.

DECISION

Bearing the above-mentioned facts in mind, the Court concluded that the accused even though he said that he went to the deceased to talk about the future of his wife and children, and the deceased’s answer enraged him and abusive language used by the deceased provoked him to shoot. But abusive language is not covered under the sudden and grave provocation (exception 1) to section 300.

Moreover, the mindset of the accused about talking of the future of his wife and children with Prem Ahuja proves that his self-control was regained up till that point in time. As a result, Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the High Court which convicted the accused under section 302, IPC for the punishment of murder with imprisonment for life, and said that there are no grounds for interference in the decision of the HC.

RELEASE OF NANAVATI

During the time of Nanavati’s trial and sentencing, Jawaharlal Nehru became the prime minister of India and his sister Vijayalakshmi Pandit as Governor of Bombay. Nanavati had very close relations with the Nehru Family Nanavati spent 3 years in prison and was released thereafter. It was feared that a pardon for him could elicit an angry reaction from the Sindhi community to which the Ahuja family belonged. At around this time, the government received an application for a pardon from Bhai Pratap, a Sindhi trader who had been a participant in the Indian independence movement, and had been convicted for misusing an import license.

Given his freedom fighter background, and the relative smallness of his offence, the government was inclined to pardon Bhai Pratap. Finally, an application seeking pardon for Nanavati was obtained even from Mamie Ahuja, sister of the deceased. She gave her assent for his pardon in writing. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, then Governor of Maharashtra, pardoned Bhai Pratap and Nanavati on the same day. After his release, Nanavati, his wife Sylvia, and their three children emigrated to Canada and settled in Toronto, Ontario. Nanavati died on 24 July 2003.

CONCLUSION

It was not the first case of the murder of the wife’s paramour by the husband, but the reason it was too much highlighted in the public was the opinion of the public towards Nanavati. In the conservative society of India, the Public saw Nanavati as a very righteous man and called his wife the lady of bad character. The Blitz magazine has played a very important role in shaping this opinion of the public, as it issued so many articles on this case. Another reason why this case got highlighted is the influence of Nehru family who were in close relations with Nanavati. Nanavati was also idealized as a middle-class man fighting against the rich paramour of his wife and was shown a very innocent person.

This case was not considered to be the fight between two parties was considered the fight between the two communities that is Parsis and Sindhis as Nanavati was a Parsi and Prem Ahuja, a Sindhi. Among the jurists, Ram Jethmalani led the prosecution while Karl Khandalavala represented Nanavati. Many Bollywood movies were even inspired after this famous case for example, Yeh Rishtey Hai Pyar Ke in 1963, Achanak in 1973, Rustom in 2016. After this case, Jury Trials were abolished in India. This is how this case has moved a long way from then to even now.

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References:

[1]  1962 AIR,  605, 1962 SCR Supl.  (1) 567

[2]  Section 302, IPC (Punishment for Murder defined in sec 300, IPC) – Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and  shall also be liable to fine.

[3]  In jury trials, jurors who are the common but educated group of persons, but not having the legal knowledge like the judge, gives the decision based on the guidelines given by the judge. The present case is the last case of jury trial in India.

[4]  Power of Governor to grant pardons, etc, and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases – The Governor of a State shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends. See https://indiankanoon.org/doc/873751/